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The Islamicate Adab Tradition vs. the Islamic Shari‘a, from
Pre-Colonial to Colonial 
1. Introduction: Religion, Distinction, Differentiation
The goal of this paper is to provide a bird’s eye view on what might qualify 
as ‘the mother of all distinctions’ within Islamicate history affecting the 
regulation of human conduct. It is a rather ‘soft’ distinction, whereby the 
ethical and literary tradition of adab works as an harmonious counter-
point, more than as a sheer alternative, to the normative discourse sub-
sumed under the notion of shari‘a, the law originating from Divine will 
(shar‘). Adab does so, however, while clearly affirming a distinctive, non-
divine (and in this sense ‘secular’) source of norms of human interaction. 
The paper is divided into two parts: the first delineates the traits of adab 
in pre-colonial times, while the second focuses on key transformations it 
underwent during the colonial era.
The background of the ‘normalcy’ of this process of distinction is in 
the view, cultivated by an important branch of the comparative historical 
sociology of religions and civilizations, which sees religion in a variety of 
regions as differentiating itself from cosmological holistic views and rituals 
during the so-called Axial Age (ca. 800-200 BCE). This Ur-differentiation, 
as it were, of religion was facilitated by its main carriers (i.e. increasingly 
specialized religious personnel) mostly by invoking transcendence. This 
was conceived as a realm that imposes norms of ethical and compassionate 
behavior on all members of a given collectivity, including its rulers. The 
operation, originally performed by a variety of prophets, philosophers and 
sages (from Isaiah through Plato to the Buddha), institutes a principled au-
tonomy of religion from other social fields. At the same time, however, the 
carriers of religious visions aspired to embrace the entire human condition, 
including its being torn between immanent interests and transcendent 
norms.1 Over the long-term, this initial differentiation of religion opened 
up the social space to a cascade of further differentiations, which instituted 
1 Karl Jaspers (1953), The Origin and Goal of History (New Haven, NJ and London: Yale 
University Press); Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1982), “The Axial Age: The Emergence of 
Transcendental Visions and the Rise of Clerics,” European Journal of Sociology 23/2: 
294–314.
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the autonomy of politics, the law, the economy, art, etc. via distinctions 
from comprehensive religious claims. Yet while we observe such successive 
fields differentiating from religion and creating non-religious or secular 
spaces, discourses and institutions, the initial differentiation of religion 
from the archaic and holistic understanding of reality still operates, as it 
were, in the background. This needs to be taken into account since we often 
tend to take this Ur-differentiation for granted or forget it altogether. Ne-
glecting this might lead to rather unilateral views of the carriers of religious 
authority as intrinsically hostile to the process of differentiation, while they 
were its prime outcome and beneficiaries, and the (at least indirect) helpers 
of several among the later waves of differentiation.
On the other hand, the outcome of differentiation processes is rarely 
clear-cut and without residues. Often, ambivalence prevails and the bound-
aries between fields are drawn in uncertain ways. Beyond the West and its 
modernity, this ambivalence is precisely what, in many cases, prevents dif-
ferentiations of secular spaces and forms of action from becoming sharp 
and producing fully autonomous spaces governed by field-specific values 
and norms. Differentiations do occur, but they appear most often as soft, 
ambivalent and hazy—like the one I am going to describe.
In what follows I will offer a schematization (and therefore a simpli-
fication) of what might be considered the key distinction within Islamic 
traditions between a religious and a non-religious (and in this sense secu-
lar) source of normativity of human conduct. I will also provide some ex-
amples of how the distinction operates. Differentiation and distinction are 
not used interchangeably, as precise synonyms.
2. The Tradition of Adab in Pre-Colonial Times
From quite early stages after the onset of the Islamicate civilization, one ob-
serves the crystallization of two major discursive traditions, both of which 
consist of intersecting dimensions of narration, habitualization, and, ulti-
mately, normativity, albeit in a variety of combinations and degrees. They 
are the tradition associated with the idea of adab, which I am going to 
define in some detail, and the tradition governed by hadith, the increas-
ingly systematic body of reports/narrations providing the quantitatively, 
and to a large extent also qualitatively, most solid ‘database’ to the entire 
normative system subsumed under the keyword of shari‘a. While hadith 
takes shape as a tradition originating from prophetic action and speech 
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(through the chain of narrations, habitualization, and normativity unfold-
ing within Muhammad’s inner circle),2 the origins of adab are more fluid 
and mixed, mainly because this genre alternately invokes (pre-Islamic) 
Arab and Persian components and ‘roots.’ What is not contested is that it 
has no specifically prophetic origin, though it did find an important place 
within the prophetic tradition of hadith. As networked sets of narrations 
with their more or less certified transmitters, both traditions crystallize in 
late Umayyad/early ‘Abbasid’ times, between the 8th and 9th century CE.
In this paper, I will focus on adab, the non-prophetic and, in this sense, 
non-religious tradition, primarily designating the quintessence of practical 
wisdom accumulated over the generations: the opposite, in principle, of 
a type of knowledge and practice originating in revelation. What is most 
remarkable, until the colonial epoch, is that the two traditions seemed to 
harmonize rather than to clash, in spite of their tendency to maintain a 
basic mutual demarcation (even by the authors who cultivated both). But 
a principled distinction was seldom over-emphasized either. Therefore, I 
hypothetically call it a soft distinction.
By representing a quite fundamental type of practical wisdom ac-
quired through learning, adab rapidly became a key Islamicate concept 
of etiquette and mastery of forms (including, if not mainly, life forms). It 
designates the right, proper way to order and invest interests and values 
within social interaction. Even more fundamentally, as famously defined 
by Barbara Metcalf, it is “proper discrimination of correct order, behaviour 
and taste.”3 Adab was primarily cultivated by courtiers and literati within 
various Islamicate courts and their bureaucracies, but it was more than 
mere self-complacent aristocratic refinement. Thus, one step further, the 
most general definition of adab would embrace the ensemble of the ethi-
cal and practical norms of virtuous and beautiful life. Far from eclipsing 
with the collapse of the High Caliphate during the 10th century CE, adab 
became even more ubiquitous during the Middle Periods (10th to 15th cen-
tury), when it morphed into a key Islamicate concept linking life conduct 
to the ways of governance and statecraft: a key human practice helping 
2 Recep Şentürk (2005), Narrative Social Structure: Anatomy of the Hadith Transmission 
Network, 610–1505 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press); Wael B. Hallaq (2013), 
The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: 
Columbia University Press).
3 Barbara Daly Metcalf (1984), “Introduction,” in Moral Conduct and Authority: The 
Place of Adab in South Asian Islam. Ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf (Berkeley and Los Ange-
les: University of California Press), 2–3.
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subjects to deal with what, in a Machiavellian vocabulary, we would call the 
conundrum of virtue and fortuna.4
Adab legitimately intersected the core dynamics in the production 
of religious knowledge and throve alongside the shari‘a tradition and its 
norms based on Qur’an and, even more, hadith, which—we should not 
forget—is a narrative corpus through which the Prophet’s wisdom of char-
acter shines and becomes exemplary, and so normative. It is important 
to observe that unlike their Sasanian predecessors, merchants operating 
within the Islamic ecumene often had a share in the court culture where 
adab flourished, even while keeping an ambivalent relation to court mi-
lieus. This participation of non-aristocratic strata in adab also facilitated 
an intense interfacing, if not exchange, between adab and hadith. Qur’anic 
verses could be woven into the edifying stories of the adab genre such as in 
the Kalila wa Dimna (an 8th century translation of ancient Indian fables), 
without however altering the inherently mundane teachings of the genre.5
 We could even define adab as a discursive tradition in its own right, 
including aesthetical and entertaining dimensions alongside edifying and 
normative ones. It stressed the requirements of civilized interaction at 
court, but also outside of it, namely with administrators and literati of other 
courts, with religious scholars, with traders, etc. It taught a know-how that 
was integral to the building of social relations. Thus, more broadly, it also 
served the goal of conflict prevention and social integration. Therefore, it 
embraced style and distinction, in the sense famously elucidated by Pierre 
Bourdieu,6 to the extent adab emphasizes a superior knowledge of social 
complexity and the nuances and vagaries of human interaction which 
are caused by the proliferation of difference in taste, values, and interests 
among human beings. This knowledge of ‘social commerce’ helps human 
subjects to maximize their own reputation also by way of eloquence, good 
speech, and effective communication.7 Such an approach is supported by 
the idea that good speech and elegant manners are not just an embellish-
ment, but a necessary ingredient of good, cultured, civilized life. In turn, 
this is seen as a condition for developing a capacity for discernment be-
tween good and bad, harmful and useful, pleasant and unpleasant, in what 
4 Neguin Yavari (2014), Advice for the Sultan: Prophetic Voices and Secular Politics in 
Medieval Islam (London: Hurst).
5 Yavari (2014), Advice for the Sultan, 57.
6 Pierre Bourdieu (1979), La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Minuit).
7 Paul L. Heck (2018), “Contested Fields, Knowledge Mobility, and Discipline Crystal-
lization,” in The Wiley Blackwell History of Islam. Ed. Armando Salvatore, Roberto Tot-
toli, and Babak Rahimi (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell), 177–94.
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turns out to be practical reason and ethical formation at once, either in 
principle dispensing of the use of religious references.
From the zenith of ‘Abbasid rule onwards, the two traditions of adab 
and hadith consolidated their normative grip over vast social strata in 
parallel to each other. One can in principle distinguish the culture and 
knowledge of the ‘ulama’, of the fuqaha’ and the muftis, largely dependent 
on hadith, on one hand, and the adab, court culture of the scribes and 
bureaucrats, on the other. Not surprisingly, Marshall Hodgson described 
the shar‘i culture as “piety-minded”, yet also suitable to regulate multiple 
aspects of social life, to aid the integration of various types of popular re-
ligiosity within a coherent institutional framework.8 Similarly, the cosmo-
politan court culture, which was originally reconstructed at the center of 
the ‘Abbasid empire on the basis of the Sasanian model, never pretended to 
suppress or replace the knowledge that rose by studying hadith and prac-
ticing fiqh with the support of Qur’anic piety.
Particularly some Sufi trends contributed to blend these two tradi-
tions, most notably during the transition between the Middle Periods and 
the modern era.9 Adab took root ever more solidly while being increasing-
ly codified and practiced within a variety of Sufi brotherhoods, which thus 
contributed to interlacing court and government milieus, trader circles and 
the ‘commoners’. In several cases, adab became a crucial concept not only 
for Sufi practice, but also for theory, in that it occupied a central place in 
several Sufi manuals addressed to aspirants and practitioners. Sufi broth-
erhoods played a mediating role between the courts and the commoners. 
Sufi leaders did not merely receive a higher culture from the courts, but 
enriched it through their active presence within courtly milieus, while en-
gaging in daily practice and dialogue with a great variety of subjects and 
groups within society at large.
To summarize this analysis, we could say that the culture of adab, 
while initially radiating from court milieus, could embrace wider social 
groups, particularly thanks to its absorption by the higher middle strata, 
with commercial entrepreneurs at their center. This class showed a propen-
8 Marshall G. S. Hodgson (1974), The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a 
World Civilization, I-III (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press), 273–5.
9 Ira M. Lapidus (1984), “Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: The Classical Muslim Concep-
tion of Adab and the Nature of Religious Fulfillment in Islam,” in Moral Conduct and 
Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam. Ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 38−61; Alexander Papas (2008), “No 
Sufism without Sufi Order: Rethinking Tarîqa and Adab with Ahmad Kâsânî Dahbidî 
(1461–1542),” Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 2/1: 4–22.
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sity to imitate and appropriate aristocratic life styles, also by acquiring the 
social prestige resulting from becoming patrons of the arts and sciences. 
Yet it was also because of the role played by some Sufi brotherhoods that 
the process was not a merely unidirectional and sharply vertical ‘trickle-
down’ as in the European cases studied by Norbert Elias.10 It was more 
a case of appropriation and diffusion, across various milieus, of both the 
prestige-laden label of adab and the practices and disciplines of self-culti-
vation associated with it.
Playing more generally on this Eliasian analogy, one could argue that 
adab helped in establishing a significant nexus between the cultivation of 
the self, on the one hand, and general ideas of integration of the body poli-
tic, on the other. This happened not only because adab provided an ethical 
grammar to the high bureaucracy, but also because of its frequent associa-
tion with discourses on the ‘circle of justice’ and/or through the genre of 
‘mirrors for princes,’ both of which contributed to the political literature 
of the epoch by defining virtues and duties of rulers and administrators. 
Within this wider field, incidentally, the use of hadith was not so rare and 
was remarkably combined with tales of non-prophetic exemplary charac-
ters.11 We might even hypothesize a certain isomorphism between the adab 
and hadith traditions in matching character-building with ideas of a gen-
eral (cosmological and socio-political) order—a hypothesis that might re-
orient the analysis of the underlying discourse through targeted inquiries. 
Adab therefore complexified (and to some extent civilized) the pre-
dominantly military character of political rule in the Middle Periods and 
facilitated its transformation during the transition to the early modern 
era.12 Especially after the advent of Mongol rule and the ensuing crystalli-
zation of a dualism between dynastic law (the Mongol yasa) and the shari‘a, 
adab could work as a civilizing emollient on both sides. Thus, overall, the 
distinction innervated by adab was not unidirectional. When I suggest the 
existence of a soft distinction, I do not intend to state that the distinction 
excluded a challenge of prophetic tradition, but rather to emphasize the 
process-like and open-ended character of the distinction. This could serve 
multiple goals by acting in a two-fold way on the self and in shaping social 
interactions (in this sense, being socio-cultural, civic, and ethical) and at 
10 Norbert Elias (1983), The Court Society (Oxford: Blackwell); Norbert Elias (2000), The 
Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell).
11 See: Yavari (2014), Advice for the Sultan.
12 Armando Salvatore (2016), The Sociology of Islam: Knowledge, Power and Civility (Ox-
ford: Wiley Blackwell).
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the level of governance and via the issuing of rulings and decisions (so hav-
ing a political and even legal significance).
This idea and practice of adab was also entertained by several religious 
scholars and enlivened parts of the hadith corpus itself, in spite of the fact 
that adab is a non-Qur’anic term. One hadith presents the Prophet as a 
champion of adab. Likewise, one can look at the fields of adab al-mufti, 
adab al-fatawa, adab al-qadi, explicitly addressed to the practitioners of 
shari‘a law.13 The most drastic argument to justify such ultimate compat-
ibility consisted in stressing that adab is ‘obviously’ Islamic, since it pro-
motes virtue: as such, it cannot be against Islam. But such understandings, 
wherever available, are the outcome of a long-term absorption process that 
does not invalidate the principled autonomy of adab as a non-religious 
type of discourse—only that the distinction is soft and ambivalent, not 
hard and straightforward.
Moreover, we can observe an internal differentiation within adab, and 
even adab operating as a factor of differentiation between various social 
functions and fields. The mother of all differentiation is in Adab al-dunya 
wa-l-din of al-Mawardi (d. 1058), where adab is simultaneously, yet dif-
ferentially applied to “the world” (al-dunya) with its complex relations and 
“the religion” (al-din) as the ethical pursuit of the hereafter. However, this 
malleability of adab also included a promise of reconciliation of differ-
ences, as evident in al-Ghazali (d. 1111), for whom the adab of the self and 
the adab of political community basically coincided. On the other hand, 
in his famous Ihya ‘ulum al-din, adab-related chapters are divided up in 
discrete sections like between adab al-akl (food), adab al-nikah (marriage), 
and al-adab fi-l-mujalasa (courtly, polite society), but also adab tilawat al-
Qur’an (Qur’an recitation). The consequence is that adab is essentially a 
method (or even a metanorm) more than a sheer norm, to be applied to all 
aspects of life, including the fields regulated by the religious sciences and 
the shari‘a.
In the same way in which the Islamicate ecumene is bigger than the 
Islamic religious community proper (the umma), there seems to be an 
ethical code that the religious scholars themselves have to acknowledge 
as having a broader purchase than the religious law. Therefore, the fuqaha’ 
should also be well-versed in adab since this enables them to improve their 
capacities to read and interpret the Qur’an and hadith. Moreover, adab was 
13 M. Khalid Masud (1984), “Adab Al-Mufti: The Muslim Understanding of Values, Char-
acteristics, and Role of a Mufti,” in Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in 
South Asian Islam. Ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press): 124–5.
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addressed to rulers and their key advisors and viziers/ministers, with a fre-
quent emphasis on the virtue of self-restraint and the rational control of 
passions instrumental to implementing a viable statecraft (as it happens 
in the previously mentioned, often ambivalent ‘mirror’ genre).14 Accord-
ingly, we have adab al-muluk (kings), adab al-sultaniyya (sultanate), adab 
al-wuzara’ (ministers), and adab atba‘ al-a’imma (the elite).15 Adab was ad-
dressed to the leaders and their followers, to the ‘big’ and to the ‘small’ ones 
within society and politics, in terms of power and social standing: adab 
al-kabir (big) was matched by adab al-saghir (small).16
In this way, adab provides a narrative and normative umbrella for a 
soft and malleable type of secularity or, as I prefer to say, secular civil-
ity, and corresponding grids of distinction. Adab should also be connected 
to other concepts, practices and institutions that have been identified as 
potential carriers of secularity within pre-colonial, Islamicate history, like 
the lukewarm, highly ambivalent reliance on shari‘a in the ‘mirrors’ for 
princes, the advent of dynastic law with Mongol and Turkic empires (yasa, 
qanun), but also adab’s mutual relations with siyasa. This is the concept 
we normally translate as ‘public policy’ or, more modernly, just ‘politics,’ 
but which in fact circumscribes a borderline area of human activity that is 
both legitimized from within the jurisprudential dimension of the shari‘a 
tradition and escapes it for delineating a separate field demarcating the 
autonomy of rulers from a too rigid application of religious norms.
One can hypothesize that this regulating impetus of the adab tradition 
was driven by the perception among Islamicate cultural elites of various 
epochs that the normative import of shari‘a, though of essential impor-
tance in keeping together the Islamic ecumene, could not be self-sufficient 
in the task of governing the complexity of the ecumene itself and the in-
creasingly complex relations with its partners and foes. Therefore, we could 
see the fields of shari‘a and adab as not just building a symmetric binary 
of distinction/differentiation but also as engaging in a continuous mutual 
accommodation through which each could be constructed as the internal 
limit of the other: while devotion to the shari‘a and its implementation 
14 Yavari (2014), Advice for the Sultan.
15 Paul E. Walker (2011), “Social Elites at the Fatimid Court,” in Court Cultures in the 
Muslim World: Seventh to Nineteenth Centuries. Ed. Albrecht Fuess and Jan-Peter Har-
tung (London and New York: Routledge), 106.
16 Jan-Peter Hartung, (2011), “Enacting the Rule of Islam: On Courtly Patronage of Reli-
gious Scholars in Pre- and Early Modern Times,” in Court Cultures in the Muslim World: 
Seventh to Nineteenth Centuries. Ed. Albrecht Fuess and Jan-Peter Hartung (London 
and New York: Routledge): 302–3.
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require the civilizing restraint of adab, adab in turn cannot openly contra-
vene shari‘a.
To sum up this review of pre-colonial times, rather than searching for 
forms of secularity as distinguished from religion, we identify socio-cul-
tural forms delineating ways of distinction, of softer distinction, between a 
corpus of norms of prophetic origin constituting the umma (the commu-
nity of the faithful proper), and a type of civil ethic innervating a ‘civilizing 
process’ of sorts. During pre-colonial times, within the wide and internally 
diversified Islamicate realms, ways of distinction remained largely open-
ended and allowed for a fluid process of continuous demarcations and 
re-amalgamations. Moreover, whatever kind of secular distinction might 
seem to emerge, it acquires a narrative and a habitualized form rather than 
a normative one. This finding matches the hypothesis that we face “differ-
ent levels of sharpness and quality of distinction”17 when we move beyond 
the West and beyond colonial modernity. This hypothesis also resonates 
with the view of Thomas Bauer, who, by stressing the Islamic (or Islami-
cate) “culture of ambiguity,” helps shed light on an in-built capacity of Mus-
lim historic actors to differentiate spaces and concepts without necessarily 
creating irreversible institutional differentiations.18
3. The Transformation of Adab during the Colonial Era
The relationship between adab and shari‘a was subjected to strains and 
changes during colonial and post-colonial times, without however pro-
ducing a linear transformation toward a ‘hard distinction’ of religion vs. 
secularity. It is rather that the two traditions could no longer harmoni-
ously (and tacitly) co-exist and interact. Starting in the late 19th century, 
several Muslim reformers saw themselves compelled to clarify the mutual 
relations between shari‘a and adab, which frequently, though not always, 
led them to subsume one under the other. Quite often, moving toward 
the 20th century, shari‘a happened to take the upper hand: a shari‘a, one 
should add, not seldom ‘purified’ from its historic substantial reliance on 
the hadith corpus, where its normative content was aligned with narra-
tion and habitus and therefore porous to adab. At times at this historical 
17 This was the formulation used by Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Christoph Kleine during 
the inaugural workshop, held in June 2016, of the HCAS Multiple Secularities – Beyond 
the West, Beyond Modernities that they direct at Leipzig University.
18 Thomas Bauer (2011), Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine andere Geschichte des Islams 
(Frankfurt: Verlag der Weltreligionen).
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juncture, one even has the impression that shari‘a leapt out of its normative 
armature altogether to become a sort of metanorm.19 Curiously, however, 
something similar seems to have happened to adab as well, to the extent 
that it morphed into an abstract value or ideal of proper, civilized modern 
behavior. This development unfolded in the context of the rise of a print-
based public sphere that favored conceptual abstraction over narration and 
habitualization.
In the process of imposition of colonial patterns of governance partic-
ularly during the 19th century, the traditionally balanced relation between 
shari‘a and adab was increasingly disturbed, if not unsettled. Indeed, both 
narratives promised to help redeploy the type of subjectivity and govern-
mentality that was in high demand within the new modern colonial set-
tings.20 During the first half of the 19th century in the Egypt of Mehmet 
Ali, not yet subject to colonial pressures and interventions but commit-
ted to ideas of modernization influenced by European models, the leading 
scholar and reformer al-Tahtawi (1801−1873) was still able to reconstruct 
a precarious balance between shari‘a and adab amidst the new aspirations 
and turbulence of the age. 
In classic theories of the body politic, adab operated as the knowl-
edge code inspiring the proper execution of the differentiated tasks of the 
various organs and limbs of the body. This approach was reworked by al-
Tahtawi in ways that could transform adab − traditionally incumbent on 
both the ruler and the subjects − into a unitary engine now specifically 
centered on the hearts (albab) of the ‘people,’ a newly emergent category of 
a proto-nationalist dictionary. As shown in a recent study by Ellen McLar-
ney, al-Tahtawi defined adab by referring to modern French concepts like 
liberty, equality, fraternity, but also and most crucially to justice and politi-
cal participation/consultation.21
The contemporary/modern adab, or “adab of the age” (al-adab al-
‘asriyya), theorized by al-Tahtawi is ever more centered on the self-mas-
tery of individual citizens22 but is also of growing importance for politics, 
siyasa.23 The connection between adab and siyasa pre-dated the colonial 
19 Armando Salvatore (1998), “La shari‘a moderne en quête de droit: Raison transcen-
dante, métanorme publique et système juridique,” Droit et Société 29: 293–316.
20 Timothy Mitchell (1991), Colonising Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press).
21 Ellen McLarney (2016), “Freedom, Justice, and the Power of Adab,” International Journal 




era, as previously noted. But now within siyasa the individual subject is 
prioritized over the ruler and his court for occupying the stage where the 
dynamics of the wider society and polity unfold. This shift resonates with 
the idea of the civilizing process of Elias, or, according to an author like 
Tim Mitchell, with a Foucaultian view of the capillarity of power and its 
circulation, with subjects acting as nodes in the social system.24
Al-Tahtawi also called for education and cultivation of language, in-
tended as proper speech, no longer being a prerogative of the courtier and 
administrator, but now extended to a wider public. This step was reflected 
by al-Tahtawi’s own linguistic interventions and reforms, helping to move 
from an elite-centered lexicon to a discourse and dictionary that could be 
appropriated and shared by the general public.25 Interestingly al-Tahtawi, 
after training as an ‘alim, had become an expert in translation (particularly 
from French to Arabic). The new socio-political Arabic lexicon that he 
contributed to create, also as the editor of the first official, printed govern-
ment bulletin in Egypt, was increasingly needed for kickstarting a program 
of higher education on a larger scale outside the traditional system of in-
struction controlled by religious scholars, and for propelling the first print 
media of the age.26
We can see here a process of adaptation and appropriation of earlier 
meanings of adab in order to cope with European colonial modernity, 
which was increasingly married to a strong notion of secular civility. There-
fore, interventions like those of al-Tahtawi can be interpreted as finalized 
to define an autochthonous type of secularity whereby adab appears as a 
marker of a soft distinction. But what is most remarkable at this juncture 
is that the previously scattered working of adab as a metanorm of good 
conduct serving a variety of social and political roles (including those of 
religious personnel) becomes now much more integrated as a civilizational 
project. As put by Ellen McLarney, al-Tahtawi “maps—or translates—the 
adab of one sphere into the adab of another”27, from individual creativity 
through learning proper linguistic skills to bodily composure and disci-
pline.28 
The focus is increasingly laid on reciprocity, as in the relation between 
the ‘ulama and the muta‘allimun, i.e. the teachers and the students/learn-
ers, but also between parents and children and rulers and citizens, whereby 
24 Mitchell (1991), Colonising Egypt.
25 McLarney (2016), “Freedom, Justice, and the Power of Adab,” 36.
26 Ibid., 27−8.
27 Ibid., 37. 
28 Ibid., 42.
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adab facilitates balancing their mutual rights and duties. In this way, adab 
becomes the source of a discourse of rights, which the shari‘a tradition 
had not shunned but formulated in rather indirect ways. Al-Tahtawi also 
comes pretty close to formulating adab in terms of freedom, equality and 
fraternity (yet matched by mercy and compassion), and is also quite ex-
plicit in grounding the adab of freedom in terms of a broadly natural rather 
than strictly divine law.29 However, the way adab was distinguished from 
shari‘a was subject to significant changes. The distinction was not really 
hardened, but remolded in ways that started to expose it to a continual, 
mutual, explicit attrition.
The ‘ulama’, a category that al-Tahtawi does not see as restricted to 
religious scholars, are redefined as precisely those teachers who secure this 
adab of freedom from oppression, as the main interpreters and teachers 
and disseminators of adab to the general public. In parallel, the ethic of 
citizenship is increasingly anchored in the virtuous consciousness of the 
individual, regardless of social class and level of instruction.30 This is a big 
transformation, but not the sudden emergence of a class of secular intel-
lectuals opposing or competing with religious scholars. Interestingly, this 
change is facilitated by retrieving the traditional metaphor of the “heart,” 
which now explicitly mediates between the private sphere of the inner fo-
rum and the public realm of responsibilities for the nation.31 
It is also important to note that in spite of his deep knowledge of French 
concepts, and particularly of the French modern political dictionary, al-
Tahtawi insisted on molding his vision on the basis of the traditional vocab-
ulary of adab.32 Accordingly, the ‘ulama’ are now tasked with teaching adab 
al-mu‘asharat, i.e. the adab of social relations. And here tanwir, “enlighten-
ment,” comes onto the scene. The ‘ulama’ should enlighten the people, the 
citizens, the common men to know their rights and learn self-mastery. The 
instrument of tanwir is ta’dib, the verbal noun that designates the enforce-
ment of adab as a program of discipline and training.33 Now adab is in-
creasingly dynamized as such a ta’dib, as an education-disciplining process 
and project, and is frequently framed in the context of the new concept of 
tamaddun, a quite explicit naming of the civilizing process. Becoming pop-




32 Ibid., 40. 
33 Ibid., 41. 
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reflects, on a linguistic level, the process-like character of the transforma-
tion and its centering on urban modes of behavior.34 
Contemporary with al-Tahtawi, the wave of Ottoman reforms known 
as tanzimat also favored a reformulation of adab (edep in Ottoman Tutk-
ish) as a larger and more inclusive cultural matrix that could help educate 
and civilize the political community (and deliver it from ignorance and 
error) better than a shari‘a-based social discourse. Some scholars have re-
ferred to the use of adab in the 19th century as an ‘invented tradition’ but 
others, starting with Şerif Mardin, have objected to it, stressing a stronger 
line of continuity of adab culture among the Ottoman ruling elite from the 
zenith of the empire in the 16th century up to the so-called long Ottoman 
century, the 19th.35 Indeed, the reforms did not start with the tanzimat but 
much earlier, in the 18th century, and elite criticism of the stagnation of the 
empire even earlier than that.
Overall, in Egypt as in the center of the Ottoman Empire and in other 
parts of the Islamicate realm, there were attempts to upgrade the narrative 
and normative culture of adab into the matrix of a rather self-sustaining 
project. This consisted in reconstructing, from the top down, viable pat-
terns of secular civility and belonging, catering to an ever more differenti-
ated grid of social classes and groups. Among the vast array of measures af-
fecting such fields were the reforms of the military, finance and the law, the 
institution of schools for aspiring civil servants, and the launch of identity 
cards or papers. Such measures exemplify the extent to which the practical 
dimension of reform was matched by a quite vocal dimension of collective 
representation, which could rely on a reconstructed and even potentiated 
view of adab.
From the end of the 19th century until the 1920s a deepening and 
re-elaboration of the teachings of key classic authors (like the previously 
mentioned al-Ghazali, al-Mawardi, but also Miskawayh and Ibn Khaldun) 
facilitated a reconstruction of adab as a complex code for ways of being 
and appearing (and for managing their mutual tensions). This area of in-
tellectual endeavor and public discourse produced increasing distinctions 
among the adab of different, often very specific, issue-defined fields: like 
between an adab providing instruction about how to cope with military 
occupation, how to educate children, how to be a wise consumer, how to 
34 Michael Gasper (2008), The Power of Representation: Publics, Peasants, and Islam in 
Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
35 Şerif Mardin (2006), “Continuity and Change in the Modernization of Turkey,” in Con-
temporary Islam: Dynamic, not Static. Ed. Abdul Aziz Said, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, 
and Meena Sharify-Funk (London and New York: Routledge), 101–6.
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cut up an artichoke or keep a distance from one’s partner in a polka, but 
also how to avoid an excessive display of one’s own religiosity in public. 
Adab became a compass for shaping a dizzying variety of civilized self-
other relations.36
 Al-Tahtawi’s interventions clearly pushed the boundaries of the con-
ceptual network gravitating around adab with the goal to facilitate a grow-
ing participation of the educated public in articulating a modern concep-
tion of social commerce. Interestingly, however, this operation of promot-
ing a conscious process of self-formation open to the citizenry is facilitated 
shari‘a’s revitalization as a tool of participatory disciplining of the rising 
Egyptian nation. With the late 19th century author al-Nadim (1845−1896), 
the European colonial pressure becomes the explicit motivation for recom-
bining the two traditions of adab and shari‘a against the background of a 
deepening program of legal reform that risked to pit positive law against 
religious norms.
 The result, with al-Nadim, is the promotion and dissemination of an 
idea of a type of adab now more than ever explicitly rearmed as a disci-
plining engine, working through the internalization of rules of social in-
tercourse, and ultimately feeding into the program of implementation of 
shari‘a in all spheres of social life. Trying to summarize the new relation-
ship, we can say that while now adab is conceived as the motor of the civi-
lizing process, shari‘a works increasingly as its ideological armature, both 
having to fit their civilizing discourse into the new reality of law codes and 
law courts. In the process, however, shari‘a becomes ever more essential-
ized and, in its public propagation as Islamic normativity, severed from its 
traditional narrative framework and habitualizing prism. Not by chance, 
many reformers called for a return to the Qur’an—a call entailing a mar-
ginalization of hadith. From the late 1920s onward, Islamist mobilization 
and discourse will take over this task of re-energizing shari‘a within the 
parameters set by reformers like al-Tahtawi and al-Nadim.
36 Iman Farag (2001), “Private Lives, Public Affairs. The Uses of Adab,” in Muslim Tra-
ditions and Modern Techniques of Power. Ed. Armando Salvatore (Hamburg: Lit/New 
Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction), 95−122.
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4. Conclusion: Continuities and Breakthroughs in the Working of Adab
In this long trajectory, we have observed a proliferating variety of forms 
of adab expressing ideas and practices of secular civility; a process that 
sharply accelerated during the colonial era. However, factors of continuity 
stand out in this long trajectory, and the most significant appear to be:
 a) A principled reliance on ‘non-religious’ sources
 b) The regulation of life conduct (‘values’) via appeal to a collective 
     ideal of good life, practiced from the inside out with the aid of 
            exemplary models to be followed
 c) An often tacit work of restraining potential excesses in the implemen- 
      tation of shari‘a both from without (social relations) and from within    
             (the self).
In this long drawn-out process, we see an increasing blurring of adab as an 
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